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Was the Great Moderation in the United States due to good policy or good
luck? Taking, as data generation process, a New Keynesian sticky-price model
in which the only source of change is the move from a passive to an active
monetary rule, we show how standard econometric methods, both reduced-
form and structural, often misinterpret good policy for good luck. Speciﬁcally,
we show how such a move is perfectly compatible with:
(a) little change in the estimated impulse-response functions to a monetary
policy shock, as in Stock and Watson (2002), Primiceri (2005), Canova and
Gambetti (2005), and Gambetti, Pappa, and Canova (2006).
(b)S i g n i ﬁcant changes in the estimated volatilities of both reduced-form
and structural shocks–as in (e.g.) Ahmed, Levin, and Wilson (2004) and Stock
and Watson (2002)–even in the absence, by construction, of any change in the
volatilities of structural innovations.
(c) Little change in the integrated normalised spectra of inﬂation and GDP
growth at the business-cycle frequencies, as in Ahmed, Levin, and Wilson
(2004).
In line with Bernanke’s (2004) conjecture, the explanation is that conven-
tional econometric methods are intrinsically incapable of capturing the role
played by the systematic component of monetary policy in (de)stabilising in-
ﬂation expectations, and are therefore inevitably bound to confuse shifts in
expected inﬂation with true structural innovations, thus giving the illusion of
good luck even when good policy is, by construction, the authentic explanation.
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domain, VARs.
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11 Introduction
Post-WWII U.S. economic history is usually divided into two distinct sub-periods.
The former period, extending up to the end of the Volcker disinﬂation, is characterised
by a large extent of macroeconomic turbulence, with highly volatile output growth,
and highly volatile and highly persistent inﬂation. The latter period, from the end of
the Volcker disinﬂation up to the present day, is characterised instead by signiﬁcantly
smaller volatilities for both inﬂation and output growth1 and, possibly, by a lower ex-
tent of inﬂation persistence.2 These dramatic changes in the reduced-form properties
of the U.S. economy over the last several decades characterise a phenomenon known
as the ‘Great Moderation’.
A vast literature has investigated the source(s) of the Great Moderation in an
attempt to disentangle the relative contributions of two main candidates: good policy
and good luck. The importance of this debate stems from the policy lessons that
can be drawn from alternative interpretations of historical experience. If the Great
Moderation has simply been the result of a more benign macroeconomic environment,
in the form of smaller non-policy shocks, then nothing, at least in principle, can
prevent the macroeconomic turbulence of the 1970s to reappear. If, by contrast, the
remarkable stability of recent years is the result of a superior monetary policy, the
outlook for the future looks decisively more benign.
Based on (time-varying) structural VAR methods, the good luck hypothesis has
been advocated by a number of authors including Stock and Watson (2002), Primiceri
(2005), Canova and Gambetti (2005), Hanson (2005), Gambetti, Pappa, and Canova
(2006) and Sims and Zha (2006) for the U.S., and Benati and Mumtaz (2005) for the
U.K.. By contrast, Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), based on an estimated sticky-price
model for the U.S., identify, in line with Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), shifts
in the systematic component of monetary policy as the main reason underlying the
dramatic stabilisation of the most recent period. How can we reconcile these two sets
of results? Isn’t it the case that methodological diﬀerences between the two approaches
m a yb ea tt h er o o to ft h ed r a m a t i c a l l yd i ﬀerent results they produce?
In a recent speech on the ‘Great Moderation’ in the U.S., Bernanke (2004) con-
jectures that this is indeed the case, as standard econometric methods fail to capture
t h ei m p a c to ft h esystematic component of monetary policy in stabilising private sec-
tor’s expectations, and therefore inevitably confuse good policy with plain good luck.
Bernanke discusses several reasons why an econometrician, by applying standard
techniques, might mistakenly attribute the impact of a more stabilising monetary
rule to an exogenous reduction in the volatility of non-policy shocks. In particular,
1See e.g. Kim and Nelson (1999), McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), Kim, Nelson, and Piger
(2004), and Stock and Watson (2002).
2This is currently one of the most hotly debated issues in empirical macroeconomics–see eg Kim,
Nelson, and Piger (2004), Cogley and Sargent (2002) and Cogley and Sargent (2005), on the one
hand, and Stock (2002).for an opposite point of view.
2he emphasizes how
[...] changes in monetary policy could conceivably aﬀe c tt h es i z ea n d
frequency of shocks hitting the economy, at least as an econometrician
would measure those shocks. [...] [C]hanges in inﬂation expectations,
which are ultimately the product of the monetary policy regime, can be
confused with truly exogenous shocks in conventional econometric analy-
ses. [...] Increases in inﬂation expectations have the ﬂavour of adverse ag-
gregate supply shocks in that they tend to increase the volatility of both
inﬂation and output, in a combination that depends on how strongly
the monetary policymakers act to oﬀset these changes in expectations.
(emphasis added)
It is important to stress, however, that Bernanke’s is, at the moment, just a
conjecture, as it had not been supported, so far, by any piece of research.
In this paper, taking as data generation process a New Keynesian sticky-price
model in which the only source of change is the move from a passive to an active
monetary rule3–i.e, from indeterminacy to determinacy–we show how standard
econometric methods, both reduced-form and structural, often tend to misinterpret
good policy for good luck. Speciﬁcally, we show how a move from a passive to an
active monetary rule is perfectly compatible with:
(a) little change in the estimated impulse-response functions to a monetary policy
shock, as in Stock and Watson (2002), Primiceri (2005), Canova and Gambetti (2005),
and Gambetti, Pappa, and Canova (2006).
(b)S i g n i ﬁcant changes in the estimated volatilities of both reduced-form and
structural shocks–as in (e.g.) Ahmed, Levin, and Wilson (2004) and Stock and
Watson (2002)–even in the absence, by construction, of any change in the volatilities
of structural innovations.
(c) Little change in the integrated normalised spectra of inﬂation, output growth
and the output gap at the business-cycle frequencies, as in Ahmed, Levin, and Wilson
(2004).
In line with Bernanke’s (2004) conjecture, the explanation is that conventional
econometric methods, both reduced-form and structural, are intrinsically incapable
of capturing the crucial role played by the systematic component of monetary policy
in (de)stabilising inﬂation expectations, and are therefore inevitably bound to confuse
shifts in expected inﬂation–which, as stressed by Bernanke, are ultimately the prod-
uct of the underlying monetary regime–with true structural innovations, thus giving
the illusion of good luck even when good policy is, by construction, the authentic
explanation.
3Given that in the present context we are ignoring the role of ﬁscal policy, the relationship
between the monetary policy stance and equilibrium (in)determinacy is one-to-one, with a passive
(active) rule being associated with an indeterminate (determinate) equilibrium. As it is well known,
in more complex settings this is not the case–see e.g. Leeper (1991).
3The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy describes the standard New
Keynesian model we use in the paper. Section 3, in the spirit of Ahmed, Levin,
and Wilson (2004), presents results based on reduced-form methods. In section 4
we estimate structural VARs based on the simulated data, identifying the structural
shocks via the sign restrictions implied by the New Keynesian model. In section 5
we discuss and interpret the results. Section 6 concludes.
2T h e M o d e l
In what follows we use the standard New Keynesian workhorse model of Clarida, Gali,
and Gertler (1999), conditional on the Bayesian estimates for the U.S. economy of
Lubik and Schorfheide (2004). In spite of its ‘bare bones’ structure, there are several
reasons for preferring this model to the more sophisticated ones of, e.g., Smets and
Wouters (2003), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2004), or Altig, Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Linde (2006). First, its simplicity allows us to clearly highlight
the conceptual issues involved in the present exercise, without the unnecessary com-
plications coming from having to deal with much more complex structures. Second,
such a simplicity makes it possible to obtain a purely analytical solution under both
determinacy and indeterminacy.4 This is especially important for the case of inde-
terminacy, as it eliminates the need to resort to the approximated numerical solution
described in Lubik and Schorfheide (2004).5 Third–and crucially–currently this is
one of the very few DSGE models estimated without imposing the restriction that the
parameters lay uniquely within the determinacy region,6 a n da sar e s u l t ,i ti st h eo n l y
one for which estimates under both determinacy and indeterminacy are available.7
The model is given by
xt = xt+1|t − τ(Rt − πt+1|t)+gt (1)
πt = βπt+1|t + κ(xt − zt) (2)
4See Lubik and Schorfheide (2003) and the technical appendix to Lubik and Schorfheide (2004),
available at Frank Schorfheide’s web page.
5For the reasons discussed, e.g., in Lubik and Schorfheide (2003)–essentially, a greater plausi-
bility on strictly logical grounds–under indeterminacy we consider the case of continuity, in which
the impulse-response functions of the model are prevented from changing discontinuously at the
boundary between the determinacy and the indeterminacy regions.
6See also the work of Davig and Leeper–e.g., Davig, Leeper, and Chung (2005), Davig and Leeper
(2005a), and Davig and Leeper (2005b)–which however is, for our own purposes, unnecessarily
complex.
7A subtle but important issue is that, as stressed by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), imposing, in
estimation, the restriction that the parameters uniquely lay within the determinacy region has the
potential to induce serious biases in the parameters’ estimates if, in fact, the data have been generated
(at least in part) under indeterminacy. Given the evidence produced by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
(1999) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), pointing towards a passive monetary rule before October
1979, this implies that estimates like those of Smets and Wouters (2003), Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (2004), or Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Linde (2006) might be seriously biased.
4Rt = ρRRt−1 +( 1− ρR)[φππt + φx(xt − zt)] +  R,t (3)
gt = ρggt−1 +  g,t and zt = ρzzt−1 +  z,t (4)
where the notation is obvious, with xt, πt, Rt, gt,a n dzt being the output gap,
inﬂation, the interest rate, a demand disturbance, and potential output, all expressed
as log-deviations from a non-stochastic steady-state.
Based on Lubik and Schorfheide’s (2004) Bayesian estimates, we calibrate the key
parameters as follows. For both periods–1960:1-1979:2 and 1982:4-1997:4, respec-
tively8–we set β=0.99, κ=0.77, τ=1.45−1, ρg=0.68, ρz=0.82, ρgz=0.14, σR=0.23,
σg=0.27, σz=1.13. We then set the coeﬃcients of the monetary policy rule to
φπ=0.77, φx=0.17, and ρR=0.60 for the former period, and to φπ=2.19, φx=0.30,
and ρR=0.84 for the latter one. Together with the other structural parameters, the
two sets of coeﬃcients for the monetary policy rule imply indeterminacy in the former
period, and determinacy in the latter one. Finally, in order to make our results more
transparent, we set the standard deviation of the sunspot shock–which only becomes
relevant under indeterminacy–to zero.9
In the controlled experiment we are designing, everything is therefore uniquely
driven, by construction, by changes in the systematic component of the monetary rule
(it important to stress that the standard deviation of the monetary policy shocks,
too, is kept constant across periods)–speciﬁcally, in the jargon of the literature on
the Great Moderation, by ‘bad policy’ before October 1979, and by ‘good policy’
after 1982. The question we then ask is: ‘Are standard econometric methods capable
of recovering the truth we ourselves constructed?’ As we will see in the next two sec-
tions, results from stochastic simulations of the New Keynesian model conditional on
Lubik and Schorfheide’s (2004) estimates provide indeed support for Bernanke’s con-
jecture, with the evidence from estimated impulse-response functions to an identiﬁed
monetary policy shock being especially startling.
Each of the results that follow is based on 10,000 simulations of the model under
both determinacy and indeterminacy. The only exception is represented by the tests
for structural breaks at unknown points in the sample in both the VAR’s innova-
tion variances, and the coeﬃcients of the VAR’s equations, which being based on
bootstrapped critical values are quite remarkably computationally intensive. In this
case–and only in this case–results are based on just 500 simulations. In order to be
exactly consistent with Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), each simulation is 78 periods
(i.e., quarters) long under indeterminacy, and 61 periods long under determinacy.10
We present results for three variables, inﬂation, the output gap, and output growth.
Inﬂation and the output gap come just straight out of the model’s simulations. As
for output growth, we ‘reconstruct’ it in the following way. The output gap measure
8These were the original sub-sample periods in Lubik and Schorfheide (2004).
9In fact, setting it equal to Lubik and Schorfheide’s estimate, 0.2, makes virtualy no diﬀerence
to the ﬁnal results. This alternative set of results is available from the authors upon request.
10In order to reduce as much as possible dependence from the initial conditions, we run a ‘pre-
simulation’ 100 periods long, which we then discard.
5Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) use to estimate their model is HP-ﬁltered log GDP,
with HP-ﬁltering being performed over the period 1955:1-1998:4. So we take log
GDP11 for the period 1955:1-1998:4, we HP-ﬁlter it, we store the two trends for the
sub-periods 1960:1-1979:2 and 1982:4-1997:4, and at each simulation we add the (log)
trends to the simulated output gaps for the two periods, thus getting two simulated
log GDP series. Finally, we ﬁrst-diﬀerence both series, thus getting two simulated
output growth series under determinacy and indeterminacy.
Let’s start from the reduced-form evidence.
3 Reduced-Form Evidence: Back to Ahmed, Levin,
and Wilson (2004)
In a well known contribution, Ahmed, Levin, and Wilson (2004) use both vector
autoregressions and frequency-domain techniques to investigate the evolution of the
reduced-form properties of the U.S. economy over the post-WWII era. Consistent
with the ﬁnding of both Kim and Nelson (1999) and McConnell and Perez-Quiros
(2000) of a break in the volatility of U.S. GDP/GNP growth in the ﬁrst quarter
of 1984, they break the overall sample period into two disjoint sub-periods, 1960:1-
1979:4 and 1984:1-2000:1, and compare their reduced-form properties along a number
of dimensions. As for inﬂation they identify, post-1984, both a sharp decline in its
overall variance, and breaks in the coeﬃcients of the corresponding equation of the
VAR. While the former change is compatible with the good luck hypothesis, the
latter, as they stress, is not. As for output growth,
‘[...] reduced innovation variance accounts for the bulk of the decline
in output volatility. For aggregate GDP, [they] cannot reject the hypoth-
esis that the post-1984 shift in the spectrum is proportional across all
frequencies. Estimating VARs across the two periods provides some evi-
dence of structural breaks in the coeﬃcients, and more support than [...]
frequency-domain results for the importance of changes in the structure
of the economy; however, a majority of the decline in output variance still
appears to be due to a reduction in innovation variance.’
They interpret their evidence for GDP growth as broadly supportive of the ‘good
luck’ hypothesis, but they are careful in pointing out how their results
[...] are consistent with a rather diﬀerent view of improved mone-
tary policy, in which–as argued by Clarida et al. (2000)–aggressive
11The GDP measure we use is GDPC1 (‘Real Gross Domestic Product, 1 Decimal, Quarterly,
Billions of Chained 2000 Dollars, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate’) from the U.S. Department of
Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
6policy works to reduce aggregate volatility by eliminating "sunspot" equi-
libria. More speciﬁcally, if improved monetary policy during the Volcker-
Greenspan era has worked predominately through ensuring a unique ra-
tional expectations equilibrium, innovation variances could be reduced, as
shifts in expectations unrelated to macroeconomic fundamentals–possibly
at work in previous periods–would now be prevented from inﬂuencing the
economy.
In spite of Ahmed, Levin, and Wilson’s care in recognising the possibility of a
monetary policy-based explanation for their ﬁndings, their contribution is routinely
classiﬁe di nt h el i t e r a t u r ea sb e l o n g i n gt ot h eg o o dl u c kc a m p .I nt h i sp a r a g r a p hw e
therefore show how most of Ahmed, Levin, and Wilson’s results are indeed compatible
with a view of U.S. post-WWII economic history in which the key source of change
has been a shift from a passive to an active monetary rule.
Table 1 reports the integrated normalised spectra of inﬂation, output growth, and
t h eo u t p u tg a p 12 within three frequency bands, [0, π/16], [π/16, π/3], and [π/3, π]–
corresponding, with quarterly data, to ﬂuctuations with a periodicity beyond 8 years,
between six quarters and eight years, and below six quarters, respectively–based on
both actual data, and 10,000 simulations of the model under determinacy and inde-
terminacy. We estimate the spectral densities by smoothing the series’ periodograms
in the frequency domain by means of a Bartlett spectral window. We select the spec-
tral bandwidth automatically via the procedure proposed by Beltrao and Bloomﬁeld
(1987). For the simulated data we report the medians of the distributions and the
90% lower and upper percentiles. For the actual data, we compute 90% conﬁdence
intervals via the spectral bootstrapping procedure introduced by Franke and Hardle
(1992).13
As the Table shows, consistent with Ahmed, Levin, and Wilson’s (2004) results
for output growth, for neither of the three variables we identify, in the actual data,
signiﬁcant changes across sub-periods in the amount of integrated normalised spectral
power at the business-cycle frequencies. As stressed by Ahmed, Levin, and Wilson
(2004, page 824), ‘improved monetary policy would be expected to shift the spectrum
primarily at business-cycle frequencies’, and, consistently with this position, they in-
terpret such lack of variation as broadly supportive of the good luck hypothesis. In
spite of its intuitive appeal, results from stochastic simulations clearly show such
a conclusion to be unwarranted, as exactly t h es a m eo u t c o m ei so b t a i n e dw i t h i na
framework in which everything is uniquely driven by a shift in the monetary rule,
from active to passive. Results from stochastic simulations for the low and the high
12Consistent with Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), we approximate the output gap with HP-ﬁltered
log GDP.
13Speciﬁcally, we use the second of the procedures they propose, in which bootstrapping is im-
plemented by sampling, with replacement, from the empirical distribution of the spectral residuals
 ∗
j =2 I(ωj)/ ˆ f(ωj),w i t hI(ωj) and ˆ f(ωj) being the (unsmoothed) periodogram and the smoothed,
consistent estimator of the spectral density respectively, and ωj being the j-th Fourier frequency.
7frequencies, on the other hand, do not conform with the picture we see in the data.
While simulations give rise, for either of the three series, to a reallocation of a signiﬁ-
cant amount of normalised spectral power from the low to the high frequencies–thus
reﬂecting the well-known higher serial correlation properties of the economy under
indeterminacy14–in the data we see some slight reallocation in this sense for inﬂa-
t i o n ,v e r yl i t t l ec h a n g ef o rt h eo u t p u tg a p ,a n das h i f ti nt h eo p p o s i t ed i r e c t i o nf o r
output growth. Although a movement of the workhorse New Keynesian model from
indeterminacy to determinacy cannot replicate all of the features of the data, such a
‘failure’ should however be put into perspective, as the main goal of the present exer-
cise is not to provide a full and complete characterisation of what we see in the data,
but rather to demostrate, by example, how changes–or lack of–in the amount of
integrated normalised spectral power at the business-cycle frequencies are, in general,
entirely uninformative for the issue at hand.
Let’s now turn to time-domain methods. In line, once again, with the analysis of
Ahmed, Levin, and Wilson (2004), we estimate, based on both actual and simulated
data, and for either of the two sub-periods, reduced-form VARs for inﬂation, output
growth, and the interest rate.15 As for the simulated data, since the authentic lag
order of the VAR representation of the New Keynesian model is one, we just estimate
a VAR(1) model. As for the actual data, given the well-known lack of reliability of
traditional lag order selection criteria16, we consider four possible lag orders, from one
to four. We then perform two types of break tests based on the Andrews and Ploberger
(1994) exp-Wald test statistic, in both cases bootstrapping the critical values as in
Diebold and Chen (1996).17. First, we test for breaks in the reduced-form innovation
variance of each equation. Second, we test for a joint break in all of the coeﬃcients
for each equation of the VAR.
Starting from the simulated data, in going from indeterminacy to determinacy we
reject the null of no breaks in the innovation variance 99.8% of the times for inﬂation,
46.6% of the times for output growth, and 100.0% of the times for the interest rate.
As for the tests for breaks in the coeﬃcients, the fractions of rejections are 99.4%,
6.1%, and 99.8% respectively. It is important to stress that while the breaks in the
coeﬃcients of the VAR are indeed there–due to the changes in the VAR representa-
tion of the model associated with the move from indeterminacy to determinacy–the
14See in particular Lubik and Schorfheide (2004).
15On the other hand, we do not estimate VARs based on the output gap. The reason is that, in
order to be fully consistent with Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), we should use (as we have previously
done) HP-ﬁltered log output as the output gap proxy. As it is well-known, unfortunately, HP-
ﬁltering (as all linear ﬁltering methods) introduces an inﬁnite moving-average representation in the
data, so that, from a strictly technical point of view, no model can be ﬁtted to ﬁltered data.
16See, e.g., Kilian and Ivanov (2005).
17As we previously mentioned, given the computational intensity of this exercise, we only consider
500 simulations of the New Keynesian model. For each of them, bootstrapped p-values are computed
based on 500 bootstrap replications. As for the actual data, on the other hand, bootstrapped p-
values are computed based on 1,000 replications.
8estimated breaks in the reduced-form innovation variance are taking place even in
the absence, by construction, of any change in the volatilities of the structural inno-
vations, and are instead entirely attributable to the shift in the monetary rule. The
reduction in the volatilities of reduced-form VARs’ residuals have been often inter-
preted in the literature as prima facie evidence in favor of the good luck hypothesis.
As in the case of the integrated normalised spectrum at the business-cycle frequen-
cies, however, the present example clearly shows, once again, how seemingly sensible
and intuitively appealing conclusions based on reduced-form methods may turn out
to be entirely unwarranted, and how the use of reduced-form methods may give rise
to highly misleading inference. As we will see in the next section, similar problems
plague structural VAR methods too, to the point of casting serious doubts about the
ability of econometric methods of capturing historical truth.
Results based on the actual data are reported in Table 2. Rejection of the null
of no breaks in the innovation variance is very strong for both inﬂation and output
growth, while for the interest rate it is strong only based on a VAR(1), and it becomes
insigniﬁcant for higher lag orders. As we have just shown, while several researchers
have interpreted the ﬁnding of breaks in the innovation variance of reduced-form
VARs as prima facie evidence in favor of the good luck hypothesis, these results
are entirely uninformative for the issue at hand, as they naturally arise under the
Lubik-Schorfheide vision of the world. Rejection of the null of a joint break in all
of the equation’s coeﬃcients, on the other hand, is strong only for inﬂation, while
it is virtually non-existent for either output growth or the interest rate. The failure
to detect breaks in the interest rate equation of the VAR is noteworthy, and it is
especially troubling for the Lubik-Schorfheide vision of the world since, as we have
just seen based on the simulated data, break tests based on boostrapped critical
values should be expected to identify breaks in the monetary rule if the breaks are
indeed there.
Let’s now turn to structural evidence.
4 Structural Evidence
Based on time-varying structural vector autoregressions, neither Primiceri (2005),
Canova and Gambetti (2005), nor Gambetti, Pappa, and Canova (2006) identify any
signiﬁcant time-variation in the estimated impulse-response functions to an identiﬁed
monetary policy shock. They interpret this result as strong evidence in favor of the
good luck hypothesis, and against the notion that monetary policy may have played
a crucial role in fostering the more stable macroeconomic environment of the most
recent years. As we will now show, such inference is entirely unwarranted,a sexactly
the same results are generated by structural VAR methods applied to the simulated
data from our experiment. Further, structural VAR methods will be shown to identify
changes in the estimated volatilities of structural innovations even in the absence, by
construction, of any change in the volatilities of the structural shocks.
9Figure 1 shows the theoretical impulse-response functions of the Lubik and Schorfheide
(2004) model under both determinacy (red line) and indeterminacy (black line). As
we previously mentioned, under indeterminacy we consider the more logically plau-
sible ‘continuity’ solution–see Lubik and Schorfheide (2003). As the ﬁgure shows,
the impact of the three structural shocks on the three variables at zero has the same
sign under either determinacy or indeterminacy.18 In what follows we will therefore
identify the three structural shocks by imposing the following sign restrictions either
only on impact–as in Faust (1998)–or both on impact and on the subsequent four
quarters.19 Speciﬁcally, we postulate that
• a positive monetary policy shock has a positive impact on the interest rate, and
a negative impact on inﬂation and the output gap (output growth);
• a positive demand non-policy shock has a positive impact on all variables; and
• a positive supply shock has a positive impact on the output gap (output growth),
and a negative impact on inﬂation and the interest rate.
For each of the 10,000 simulations under either determinacy or indeterminacy,
we compute the structural impact matrix, A0, via the procedure recently introduced
by Rubio, Waggoner, and Zha (2005).20 Speciﬁcally, let Ω = P · D · P0 be the
eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition of the VAR’s estimated covariance matrix Ω,
and let ˜ A0 ≡ P ·D
1
2.W ed r a wa nN ×N matrix, K,f r o mt h eN(0, 1) distribution, we
take the QR decomposition of K–that is, we compute matrices Q and R such that
K=Q · R–and we compute the structural impact matrix as A0= ˜ A0 · Q0.F o l l o w i n g
Rubio, Waggoner, and Zha (2005), for each of the 10,000 simulations we keep on
drawing (i.e., computing rotations) until the sign restrictions are satisﬁed.
Although we plan, in future work, to also consider the alternative identiﬁcation
scheme of Sims and Zha (2006), which allows to only identify monetary policy shocks,
but without exploiting the questionable recursive assumption of the Cholesky de-
composition, we regard our choice of imposing the sign restrictions implied by the
model as the most natural one. In particular, other identifying restrictions–e.g.,
Cholesky–suﬀer from the notable drawback of being false under both determinacy
and indeterminacy, so that, in the end, it would not be clear at all what to make of
the results obtained by imposing such restrictions.
Figures 2 and 3 show, in the top rows, the distributions of the estimated impulse-
response functions (henceforth, IRFs) to a unitary monetary shock for the interest
rate, inﬂation, and the output gap (output growth), based on 10,000 simulations
18This is a key reason to prefer the ‘continuity’ solution to the alternative ‘orthogonality’ one. As
shown by Lubik and Schorfheide (2003), under orthogonality inﬂation increases on impact under
indeterminacy in response to a monetary contraction (i.e., a positive monetary shock).
19[on impact and on the subsequent four quarters: still to be done]
20See at http://home.earthlink.net/~tzha02/ProgramCode/SRestrictRWZalg.m.
10of the model under both determinacy and indeterminacy, while the bottom rows
plot the medians of the two distributions shown in the corresponding panels in the
top row. Focussing on the medians of the distributions, a striking ﬁnding emerging
from the two ﬁgures is the virtual invariance of estimated IRFs to changes in the
systematic component of monetary policy so dramatic as to move the economy from
the indeterminacy to the determinacy region. For inﬂation, in particular, the medians
of the distributions are virtually identical based on either the VAR with the output
gap or the one with output growth, in spite of the fact that the coeﬃcient on inﬂation
in the monetary rule goes from 0.77 during the pre-October 1979 period to 2.19 over
the period following the end of the Volcker disinﬂation. As in the case of inﬂation, the
medians of the distributions of the estimated IRFs for output growth are virtually
indistinguishable across the two periods. Finally, both the interest rate and the output
gap exhibit some mild extent of variation, but clearly not nearly as comparable to
what one would expect, ex-ante,b a s e do nk n o w l e d g eo ft h ee x t e n to ft h es h i f t si nt h e
monetary rule.
These results clearly show how
• the inference drawn by Primiceri (2005), Canova and Gambetti (2005), and
Gambetti, Pappa, and Canova (2006) from analogous evidence based on U.S.
data, against good policy, and in favour of good luck, is entirely unwarranted,
as lack of time-variation in estimated IRFs to a monetary policy shock emerges
naturally from the present experiment.
• In general, lack of time-variation in estimated IRFs to a monetary shock is
entirely uninformative for the issue of investigating the role played by monetary
policy in fostering the greater macroeconomic stability of recent years.
Table3 shows the estimated standard deviations of structural shocks based on
structural VARs with either the output gap or output growth. A key ﬁnding emerging
from the table is that, in spite of the complete lack of variation, by construction, in the
volatilities of structural innovations, the estimated volatilities of structural non-policy
shocks exhibit a quite substantial extent of variation, with the standard deviation of
the demand non-policy shock increasing, and that of the supply shock decreasing,
based on either VAR speciﬁcation. The estimated volatility of the monetary policuy
shock, on the other hand, exhibits virtually no time-variation across the two sub-
periods. Although the estimated pattern of variation in the volatilities of the non-
policy shocks, with one increasing and the other decreasing, does not bear clear-cut
implications for the plausibility of a monetary policy-based explanation of the Great
Moderation, a key point to stress is how, once again, structural VAR methods give
rise to highly misleading inference when applied to data generated at least in part
under indeterminacy.
115C o n c l u s i o n s
Taking, as data generation process, a New Keynesian sticky-price model in which
t h eo n l ys o u r c eo fc h a n g ei st h em o v ef r o map a s s i v et oa na c t i v em o n e t a r yr u l e – i . e ,
from indeterminacy to determinacy–in this paper we show how standard econometric
methods, both reduced-form and structural, often misinterpret good policy for good
luck. Speciﬁcally, we show how a move from a passive to an active monetary rule is
perfectly compatible with:
(a) little change in the estimated impulse-response functions to a monetary policy
shock, as in Stock and Watson (2002), Primiceri (2005), Canova and Gambetti (2005),
and Gambetti, Pappa, and Canova (2006).
(b)S i g n i ﬁcant changes in the estimated volatilities of both reduced-form and
structural shocks–as in (e.g.) Ahmed, Levin, and Wilson (2004) and Stock and
Watson (2002)–even in the absence, by construction, of any change in the volatilities
of structural innovations.
(c) Little change in the integrated normalised spectra of inﬂation, output growth
and the output gap at the business-cycle frequencies, as in Ahmed, Levin, and Wilson
(2004).
In line with Bernanke’s (2004) conjecture, the explanation is that conventional
econometric methods, both reduced-form and structural, are intrinsically incapable
of capturing the crucial role played by the systematic component of monetary policy
in (de)stabilising inﬂation expectations, and are therefore inevitably bound to confuse
shifts in expected inﬂation–which, as stressed by Bernanke, are ultimately the prod-
uct of the underlying monetary regime–with true structural innovations, thus giving
the illusion of good luck even when good policy is, by construction, the authentic
explanation.
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15Table 1 Integrated normalised spectra of inﬂation and output growth
within three frequency bands
Inﬂation:a
Actual estimatedb Model-generatedc
Pre-October Post-Volcker Pre-October Post-Volcker
1979 stabilisation 1979 stabilisation
Low frequencies 0.80 [0.64; 0.86] 0.74 [0.45; 0.83] 0.30 [0.13; 0.53] 0.09 [0.03; 0.22]
Business-cycle
frequencies 0.17 [0.12; 0.30] 0.18 [0.11; 0.33] 0.42 [0.27; 0.57] 0.40 [0.27; 0.55]
High frequencies 0.03 [0.02; 0.07] 0.08 [0.03; 0.23] 0.28 [0.17; 0.43] 0.49 [0.35; 0.65]
Output gap:d
Actual estimatedb Model-generatedc
Pre-October Post-Volcker Pre-October Post-Volcker
1979 stabilisation 1979
Low frequencies 0.20 [0.14; 0.26] 0.20 [0.13; 0.20] 0.20 [0.08; 0.38] 0.10 [0.03; 0.24]
Business-cycle
frequencies 0.70 [0.62; 0.76] 0.68 [0.61; 0.74] 0.40 [0.27; 0.54] 0.41 [0.27; 0.55]
High frequencies 0.10 [0.07; 0.15] 0.12 [0.10; 0.16] 0.39 [0.26; 0.54] 0.47 [0.33; 0.63]
Output growth:
Actual estimatedb Model-generatedc
Pre-October Post-Volcker Pre-October Post-Volcker
1979 stabilisation 1979 stabilisation
Low frequencies 0.49 [0.28; 0.62] 0.66 [0.41; 0.75] 0.67 [0.61; 0.72] 0.48 [0.40; 0.56]
Business-cycle
frequencies 0.23 [0.16; 0.33] 0.26 [0.19; 0.42] 0.13 [0.10; 0.18] 0.16 [0.11; 0.23]
High frequencies 0.28 [0.19; 0.43] 0.08 [0.05; 0.18] 0.19 [0.15; 0.25] 0.36 [0.27; 0.45]
a Based on GDP deﬂator inﬂation. bConﬁdence intervals have been computed via the
Franke and Hardle (1992) spectral bootstrapping procedure. cMedian of the distribution
and 90% lower and upper percentiles, based on 10,000 replications. a Approximated
as HP-ﬁltered log real GDP.
16Table 2 Testing for breaks in the VAR’s equations: Wald test
statistics and bootstrapped p-values
Testing for breaks Lag order:
in the equation for: p=1 p=2 p=3 p=4
Testing for breaks in the innovation variance:
inﬂationa 9.84 (4.0E-3) 7.29 (0.015) 8.88 (8.7E-3) 10.51 (0.004)
output growth 16.89 (3.0E-4) 18.75 (0.000) 19.81 (0.000) 19.17 (0.000)
interest rateb 15.67 (0.036) 14.05 (0.112) 12.12 (0.130) 9.53 (0.209)
Testing for joint breaks in the equation’s coeﬃcients:
inﬂationa 35.12 (0.000) 24.15 (0.001) 21.85 (0.016) 20.37 (0.084)
output growth 1.20 (0.886) 1.26 (0.982) 6.48 (0.700) 7.37 (0.817)
interest rateb 3.65 (0.372) 5.18 (0.521) 5.58 (0.802) 11.24 (0.522)
a Based on GDP deﬂator inﬂation. b Federal funds rate.
Table 3 Standard deviations of structural shocks, median estima-
tes and 90% conﬁdence intervals, based on sign restrictions
Monetary policy Demand non-policy Supply
Based on the structural VAR with output growth:
Pre-October 1979 0.110 [0.013; 0.205] 0.459 [0.053; 0.916] 0.551 [0.332; 0.736]
Post-Volcker
stabilisation 0.118 [0.022; 0.187] 0.246 [0.029; 0.517] 0.694 [0.308; 0.981]
Based on the structural VAR with the output gap:
Pre-October 1979 0.114 [0.014; 0.209] 0.428 [0.048; 0.877] 0.516 [0.334; 0.667]
Post-Volcker
stabilisation 0.121 [0.022; 0.191] 0.241 [0.026; 0.516] 0.676 [0.321; 0.939]



































































Figure 1: Impulse-response functions in the estimated New Keynesian model of Lubik
and Schorfheide (2004)




















































































Figure 2: Estimated impulse-response functions to a unitary monetary shock based
on sign restrictions (based on the output gap)





















































































Figure 3: Estimated impulse-response functions to a unitary monetary shock based
on sign restrictions (based on output growth)
20